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LABOR LEGISLATION-POLICE POWER OF THE STATE.
On August io, 19o6, the Court of Special Sessions. of New
York City, handed down a decision which has aroused much dis-
cussion among the members of the legal profession generally.
The Court decided in the case of People v. Williams, that that
portion of Section 77, Article 6, entitled "Factories" of the Gen-
eral Laws relating to Labor, which provided that no female shall
be employed or permitted to work in any factory before 6 o'clock
in the morning or after 9 o'clock in the evening of any day, etc.,
is an unconstitutional invasion of the rights of individual liberty
and property and not within the police power of the Legislature.
Strange to say, this decision has been the occasion of rather
severe comment by several of the current legal periodicals. In
examining this decision the fact must not be overlooked, how-
ever, that its scope is by no means so far reaching as a cursory
reading might seem to indicate. In fact another clause of the
same statute, prohibiting women from working in factories more
than ten hours a day, was not held to be unconstitutional, on the
contrary the court intimated that the latter provision might well
be viewed as a valid health law. People v. Williams, the court
confined itself to a condemnation of that portion of the statute
which authorized the conviction of an employer who should em-
ploy a woman in manufacturing during certain prescribed hours
irrespective of the number of hours she had worked or had con-
tracted to work on the day in question.
At present, in spite of the decision by the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, holding
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the limitation of a ten-hour day for employees of bakeries uncon-
stitutional, there seems to be a growing sentiment in favor of the
power of the State to enact such laws under the exercise of its
police power.
To give an exact definition of the police power of the Legisla-
ture, which shall be neither too narrow nor too comprehensive,
is probably impossible. The courts have consistently refused to
to lay (town any exact definition. Stone v. Mississippi, ioi U. S.
814. The police power of a State, however, is co-extensive with
self-protection, and has been, not inaptly, termed "the law
of overruling necessity." It is that inherent and plenary power
in the State which enables it to prohibit all things detrimental to
the comfort and welfare of society. Lakeview v. Rosehill Ceme-
tery, 70 Ill. 194. The Legislature is endowed with discretion as
to the extent to which its provisions shall go provided its acts do
not go beyond the great principle of securing the public welfare.
Its duty to provide for the public health and safety within well
defined limits and with discretion is imperative. State v. Noyes,
47 Me. 189. But the police power of the State can never be in-
voked as an excuse for an arbitrary, oppressive and unjust legis-
lation not in any way promotive of the public health, safety or
morals. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97.
In many states statutes, which apparently regulate the in-
dividual freedom of contract to a considerable degree, have
recently been sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of
the State. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Common-
wealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 283, held that a statute
forbidding the employment of women or children under 18, in
manufacturing more than ten hours a day was constitutional
as a valid health regulation. Also in the more recent case State
v. Huller, (Oregon) 85 Pac. Rep. 855, it was held that a statute
making it a misdemeanor for any employer to require any female
to work in any factory, laundry or mechanical establishment
more than ten hours a day, did not violate the 34 th. Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution.
Such statutes as those just described must, however, be sharp-
ly distinguished from those of the character of the one repudiated
in People v. Williams, Supra. There is no doubt that laws re-
stricting the hours of labor uniformly for both sexes to reason-
able periods would be valid as health regulations. And if we
look upon limitations of the hours of labor in factories as a
measure of physical protection, a discrimination between men
and women cannot be condemned as arbitrary. Freund on Police
Power, p. 298. But in every case where legislative enactments,
which operate upon classes of individuals only, have been held
valid, it has been where the classification was reasonable and
not arbitrary. Leep v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 58 Ark. 407.
Public policy requires the utmost freedom of contract. Print-
ing Co. v. Lampson, L. R. Eq., Cas. 462. Under the constitu-
tion women are entitled to the same rights as are secured to
men. The law accords to her as to every other citizen, the
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natural right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty and
industry in the arts, sciences, professions or other vocations. Be-
fore the law her right to a choice of vocations cannot be denied
or abridged on account of sex. Re Leack's Petition, 134 Ind. 665.
There would seem to be no reasonable ground except the single
one of physical protection why a woman should be deprived of
the right to determine for herself how many hours during each
day she can and may work in an employment conceded to be law-
ful in itself and suitable for her to engage in. Ritche v. People,
z55 Ill. 88; Exparte Kuback, 8t Cal. 274. The police power, no
matter how broad, is not above the Constitution. It is true that
the conflict between the legislative act and a specific provisions of
the Constitution or fundamental law must be clearly apparent or
the Judiciary will not be justified in holding it unconstitutional.
Woodworth v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. 38 Cal. 6oo. But to be sus-
tained, the act passed in pursuance of the police power must have
some apparent relation to the ends sought to be accomplished,
viz., to the comfort safety and welfare of society. It cannot in-
vade the rights of persons and property under the guise of a police
regulation when it is not such in fact. ReJacobs, 98 N. Y. 98;
People v. Gillson, 1o9 N. Y. 389.
Viewed in the light of the forgoing suggestions, the decision in
People v. Williams, would seem to be in accord with the prevail-
ing opinion at the present time. As was said in one of the com-
ments on the case, it is probable that the chivalric favoritism for
women, which prevails in this country probably more that any-
where else, rather than any scientific conviction of sanitary or
hygienic ends, is the basis of such legislation.
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CLBMONS VS. MEADOWS.
A recent case reported in 94 S. W. 13, decided by the Court'
of Appeals of Kentucky, involves the legality of a contract be-
tween two competing hotel proprietors, whereby one agreed, for
a consideration, to keep his hotel closed for a period of three
years. This agreement was held to be void, as the hotel keeper
owed a duty to the public, and could not contract in violation
of this duty.
The law in regard to contracts in restraint of trade has under-
gone a gradual and beneficial reform, largely due to the changed
conditions of the commercial world. The earliest cases reported
on this subject show that contracts in restraint of trade, even
though limited as to time and place were void as being a-.ainst
the common law. Year Book 2 Hers. 5 fol. 5, p. -6 (1415).
The strictness of this rule was due to the English law of ap-
prenticeship. This law forbade any trade until a certain ap-
prenticehip had been served and then a formal admission to a
guild was required. The tradesman must have continued in
that guild or do nothing. Naturally any agreement which
would restrain his practicing his trade was severely dealt with.
The courts would not allow a man to barter away his usefulness,
and by enforced idleness, to a certain extent pauperize himself.
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The law in this form remained for two hundred years un-
changed. But in 1621, in the case of Broad vs. Jollyfe, Cro. jac.
596, the law was relaxed somewhat, and it was decided that, for
a valuable consideration, one might agree not to use his trade in
a particular place. It was said that the consideration was neces-
sary in order to balance the restraint of trade. So too in Davis
vs. Mason, T. R. i t8, decided in 1793, a contract to refrain
from a trade limited as to time and place, and founded on a valu-
able consideration, was held good. The basis of these decisions
was that the restraint was limited in space for as it is said
Cowen 307, decided in 1827, that "a restraint throughout the
kingdom" was bad.
The final step in the development of this law, as shown by
the modern authorities, was to disregard the partiality of the
restraint, and decide the legality of each contract on its own
facts and circumstances. The question as to the validity of the
restraint imposed at present depends on what is reasonably
necessary to protect the person for whose benefit the contract
was made, having regard to the nature of the business and the
territory embraced in its trading operations. Diamond Match
Co. vs. Robeer, also National Benefit Co. vs. Union Hospital Co.,
i S. R. A. 437 and cases cited.
In the case of persons owing a duty to the public, another
question enters into such a contract. Here the public is affected
more directly, and if the public interests are endangered, the
contract threatening them must fall. In Clemons vs. Meadows,
the two contracting parties were the owners of the only two
first-class hotels in the town. An agreement to close one al-
though for a limited time might affect the travelling public
seriously. Although it is admitted that a hotel-proprietor might
close his hotel if he so desires, yet the interest of the public
demands that he shall not contract away his right to keep his
hotel open in favor of a competing hotel manager. The court
thus applies the same reasoning to agreements in respect to
hotels as it does to similar contracts between railroads; the
ratio decidendi is not the character of the contract, but the char-
acter of the contracting parties. But this power of the courts
to declare a contract void on the grounds of public policy should
be exercised guardedly, as it is quite as much in accord with
justice that the liberty to make a legal contract should be pro-
tected as that a remedy for a breach of an illegal contract should
be denied.
THE RIGHT TO SPECULATE IN THEATRE TICKETS UPHELD.
A decision of interest to proprietors of theatres, college ath-
letic associations and all who sell tickets for any public perform-
ance or amusement was recently rendered by the Supreme Court
of California in the case of Ex Parte Quarg, reported in the 84
Pac. 766.
In 1905 the Legislature of California passed a statute pro-
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hibiting any person from selling tickets to theatres or other
public places of amusement for a price higher than that origin-
ally charged by the management. An examination of the
statutes of the various states discloses no similar enactments and
it was probably passed in response to the constantly growing
demand for the suppression of the professional ticket speculator.
The act is declared unconstitutional-not because it contra-
venes the x4 th Amendment as to liberty of contract-but gen-
erally as opposed to that clause of the California constitution
which secures to every person the right of "acquiring, possessing
and protecting property."
There are two subsidiary grounds which seem to have much
bearing on the final decision.
The first is that the right to provide entertainment for the
public and to sell tickets therefor is strictly private and not a
matter of such public concern or general interest as to come
within the police power on the basis of protecting the public
health, morals, safety or general welfare.
The second ground is that the statute in question does not
attempt to prevent the simple resale or transfer of such tickets
but only a resale at an advanced price over the original selling
price and also that it is directed against the resale of all tickets
whether assignable or not. Under the latter objection either or
both the original or subsequent owners are bound by a scale of
prices fixed at a level prescribed by the state.
It is at least questionable whether in any of the other states
a theatre ticket is prolperty. At common law it was a mere
license revocable at the option of the original seller and to be
held upon any condition which he might see fit to print upon it.
Should the holder be refused admittance or, under the earlier
decisions, even if expelled, his only redress was an action for the
purchase price and the direct expenses to which he had been put
by the refusal or ejection. Homey v. Nion, 2-I3 Pa. 20 (decided
in 19o5).
The right of the original vendor to make the ticket not trans-
ferable by a printed notice thereon was undisputed or at least
not seriously contested, at least in this country, until the case of
Hollister v. Hayinan, 183 N. Y. 250. This was a test case and
arose from the endeavors of a New York manager to drive away
the speculators from the sidewalk in front of his theatre. All
tickets sold at the box-office contained the restriction that they
would not be honored if bought from anyone on the sidewalk in
front of the theatre. The i 4 th Amendment was invoked by the
speculators but the manager's right to freely impose any lawful
conditions he saw fit was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
In 1893 the Legislature of California passed an act making a
theatre ticket property, when sold unconditionally, and provid-
ing that any manager, proprietor, etc., who should refuse the
holder admission to the place of amusement be fined $ioo, mak-
ing a demand for admission necessary and operating only in
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favor of those who presented themselves in proper condition for
admission.
Tickets on which any conditions were printed or restrictions
made in writing or printing by the original vendor were ex-
cepted from the operation of the act. In the case of Greenberg
v. Western Turf Assoc., 140 Cal. 36o, the Supreme Court of
California held the act to be constitutional and by this decision,
probably for the first time, a thehtre ticket was made property
in the full sense of the word.
Conceding therefore that the regulation of traffic in
theatre tickets is beyond the police power of the state, the deci-
sion in the latest case (Ex Parte Quarg) is justified by the statute
of 1903, making the ticket property when sold without condi-
tions. The distinction drawn between the regulation of allsales
and the prohibition of sales at an advance while clear enough is
unnecessary to the decision of the case.
While all theatre-goers realize and feel the effect of the
tendency to manipulate the sale of tickets for all the popular
amusements and to hold the most desirable seats at almost pro-
hibitive figures, a summary of the decisions would indicate that
the remedy must be provided by the proprietors or managers of
the amusements and that such control or regulation is entirely
beyond the power of the Legislatures.
THE RIGHT OF A JURY TO DRAW ANY INFERENCE FROM THE
REFUSAL OF A PARTY TO WAIVE PRIVILEGE.
In the late case of the Penna. R. R. Co. v. Durkee, decided
July 24, 19o6, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the second
circuit overrules the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court, by holding that in an action for damages, for in-
juries to the person, the trial judge properly refused to charge
the jury that they might infer that the plaintiff's refusal to waive
her privilege, and allow her physician to testify as to her con-
dition, was due to the fact that such testimony would have been
unfavorable to her, or in fact to make any inference at all.
This question of inference from refusal of party to waive priv-
ilege has been a long mooted one, and in the case of Deutschmann
v. Third Ave. R. R2. Co, 87 App. Div. 503, where the facts were
very similar, the Appellate Division holds directly opposite to
the case under discussion, and in the opinion says; "the jury is
always justified in talking into consideration the attitude, ap-
pearance, and acts of parties and witnesses upon a trial, and to
deduce therefrom such inferences as fairly arise out of the given
circumstances, and we see no reason why they may not also take
into consideration any objection interposed which shuts out the
introduction of testimony. And in William v. Raoc R. Co., 3 App.
Div. og, the court in discussing this question says: "I think the
rule is as applicable to a case in which a party fails to interrogate
a friendly witness, so situated as to be presumed to have know-
ledge of the existence or non-existence, of the vital facts in
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issue, as it is in the case of a failure to produce such a witness.
I think the omission to interrogate a friendly witness in respect
to facts presumably within his knowledge, is more significant
than the failure to call such a person as a witness, and that the
presumption that the testimony would not have been favorable
to the party's case is stronger than the one which arises from the
failure to produce such a person as a witness." To like effect
are Kane v Rochester Ry. Co., 74 App. Div. 575, and People v.
Hovey, 92 N. Y. 554. The upholders of this strict construction,
adopted by the Appellate Division, base their opinion also on the
ground of fraud and the great dangers arising from the abuse of
the privilege where a more liberal view is taken.
CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS-STATEMENTS CONSISTENT WITH
TESTIMONY.
In Burks v. State, 93 S. W., 983, decided by the Supreme
Court of Arkansas, in March, I9o6, it was held that where a wit-
ness has denied having made statements contradictory of his tes.
timony, and evidence of contradictory statements is admitted,
former statements of his consistent with his testimony are not
admissible to support him, in the absence of proof of change in
the circumstances or relations which might have prompted a
recent fabrication or design to misrepresent the facts.
In Robb v. Hackley, 23 Wend. 52, it was strongly asserted by
Bronson, J., "But as a general, almost universal rule, evidence
of what the witness has said out of court, cannot be received to
fortify his testimony. It violates the first principle in the law
of evidence to allow a party to be affected either in person, or
property, by the declaration of a witness made without oath.
It is no answer to say that such evidence will not give credit
and, therefore, can do no harm. Evidence should never be given
the jury which they are not at liberty to believe."
Formerly in England, previous consonant statements by a
witness were considered admissible in evidence to support his
testimony, given by him at the trial, the same as previous incon-
sistent statements to impeach him. ilfcCord v. State, 83 Ga. 521.
This broad rule, however, was found to be radically unsound
and from the time of the case King-,. Parker, 3 Douglass 242,
has generally been considered as exploded.
A remnant of the rule may be expressed as we find it in x
Thomp. Tr Sec. 574, where the witness is charged with testify-
ing under influence of some motive prompting him to make a
false statement, it may be shown that he made similar state-
ments at a time when the imputed motive had no existence.
This view is entertained by Greenleaf, but he otherwise follows
the great weight of authority which hold that such statements
are not admissible in evidence to fortify the testimony of the
witness.
The most that could be claimed for such testimony in this
view, would be, that it rendered the last statement more prob-
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able and worthy of credit, because, although the witness had
made a contradictory statement he had made another statement
similar to those to which he had testified before a jury. Com. v.
Jenkins, zo Gray 485.
A man untruthful out of court is likely to be untruthful in
court. Since the self contradiction is conceded, it remains a
damaging fact, and it is in no sense explained away by the con-
sistent statement. It is just as discrediting if once uttered, even
though the other story has been consistently told a score of
times Kipp v. Silvermn=, 25 Mont. 295.
Although the above side of the question as to the inadmissi-
bility of such statements is supported by an overwhelming
weight of authority, yet the courts which hold to the doctrine
based on the admissibility of such consistent statement are not
entirely void of reason. The admissibility of such evidence rests
on the obvious principle, that as conflicting statements impair,
so uniform and cqnsiste:it statements sustain and strengthen his
credit before a jury. This reasoning, however, is not true to
generally accepted principles. All will concede that an untruth
leaves its mark on the character of the publisher and no amount
of good done by the person can clear the character of that
blemish. In as much as this applies to every day affairs of life,
why depart from the principle simply because it is being acted
upon in legal proceedings? In some jurisdictions such a state-
ment is admitted for the purpose of sustaining the credibilitr
of the witness, but not for the purpose of confirming his state-
ment as to the facts sworn to by him at the trial. State v.
Parish, 79 N. C. 61o.
Even in those jurisdictions where consistent statements are
allowed, the courts are unwilling to announce the doctrine un-
qualifiedly, but hedge the principle about with innumerable re-
finements.
NOVATION DISTINGUISHED FROM ACCORD WITHOUT SATISFACTION.
The tendency of the courts is to favor compromise agree-
ments, and to support their terms wherever possible. The ques-
tion, however, whether the compromise agreement will be con-
sidered as a novation, or as an accord without satisfaction is
often times of great difficulty to determine. If a novation, the
new contract completely extinquishes the old and forms the basis
of further settlement. If it is an accord without satisfaction, the
old contract survives and its terms may be enforced
In Bandman v. Finn, decided June 21, z9o6, in New York
Court of Appeals on an appeal from the Appellate Division (89
N. Y. App. 504), Cullen, Ch. J reviews this question. Here there
was an unmatured and contingent obligation, for which the
plaintiff had no cause of action. The parties had agreed for a
settlement by the payment of a smaller amount than that con-
templated upon the happening of the contingency. Such an
agreement, it was held, constituted a novation and the plaintiff
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was not allowed to recover on his original obligation. Haight J.,
dissenting.
The common conception of a novation is that of an agree-
ment whereby a third person is substituted to the rights and
liabilities of one of the original contractors. The form of nova-
tion here treated is that of a substitution of a new agreement
for an old one, the parties remaining the same. In a novation
there must be an extinguishment of the original obligation by
the substitution of a new contract. A cause of action on con-
tract or tort may be extinguished by an agreement between the
parties There is no need that this agreement which is the con-
sideration for the satisfaction should be executed; it may be
executory. If the subsequent agreement is accepted in satisfac-
tion, and this appears expressly or by implication, the original
cause of action is merged and extinguished. Kromer v. Heim,
75 N. Y. 574. A new contract inconsistent with the original
impliedly discharges the latter without express provision to
that effect. Renard v. Sampson, 12 N. Y. 561; Stow v. Russel,
36 Ill. 18.
If one having a debt or claim against another, satisfies or
releases it in consideration of an executory promise by the debtor,
he cannot afterward enforce his original cause of action upon a
mere failure of the other party to perform his promise, for he
has a remedy to compel performance. Morehouse v. Second N. B.,
98 N. Y. 503. A promise itself constitutes sufficient considera-
tion to support a new agreement. Nassoiz v. Tomlinson, 148
N. Y. 326. It is not, therefore, material whether the disputed
claims were valid or not. Wehrum v. Kuhn, 61 N. Y. 62;
Flegal v. Hoover, 156 Penn St. 276. But the claims must have
been bona-fide. Cases collected, 2 Ed. Clark on Cont. 125.
Accord and satisfaction is an agreement between two parties
to give and accept something in satisfaction of a right of action
which one has against the other, which when performed is a bar
to all actions upon this account (Bouvier's Dict.) The original
obligation must be an existing obligation and continue until
complete execution of the new agreement. If the execution of
the new agreement fails the original obligation survives. Hearn
v. Kiehl, 38 Penn. St. 146. While a new agreement may not
discharge a prior contract the performance of the new agreement
will do so. Rogers v. Rogers, 139 Mass. 440; Thompson v. Poor,
147 N. Y. 402. Where an accord is relied on it must be executed;
readiness to perform is not sufficient, nor is part performance
adequate. An accord must always be entirely executed and not
executory in any part. 2 Parsons on Cont. 193; Russel v. Sytle,
6 Wend. 39 o . Where a novation is relied, on failure to perform
does not subject the party to liability under the old original debt
or claim. It does not work the hardship which failure to perform
an accord often does, and for this reason is encouraged by the
courts. Accord and satisfaction when it consists in the substi-
tion of a new contract for an old one, and the substituted con-
tract is accepted without performance as a satisfaction of the old
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contract, is a novation. (Note to Harrison v Henderson, 67
Kan 194) in oo Am. St. Rep. 393.)
The courts in every case try to carry out the intention of the
parties manifested by the compromise agreements, and as in-
timated above lean towards construing doubtful cases as nova-
tions, rather than accords without satisfaction. The interests
of justice are thus considered better maintained.
This matter of privileged communication is of great anti-
quity, and is one of the safeguards that both the American and
English courts have seen fit to throw about private affairs, and
to preserve inviolate the confidential relations of patients with
their physicians and clients with their lawyers. It is a safe-
guard similar to that recognized in criminal cases where no in-
ference is allowed to be drawn from the failure of the accused to
take the stand. To allow any inference to be drawn either
favorable, or unfavorable, from a refusal to waive the privilege
of a confidential communication to a physician is only to nullify
the effect of such a provision. It is true that the privilege is
susceptible of great abuse, but the very strict construction of
the rule, given to it by the Appellate Division, in doing away
with this evil, tends to cause a much greater evil by practically
abolishing the privilege itself.
The text books and the other states uphold the decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals and Wigmore in his work on
Evidence, Sec. 2386 specifically says: "When the privilege is
claimed by a patient who is a party, no inference as to the facts
suppressed can be drawn" and the Supreme Court of Indiana in
Hackney, et al. v. Foyce, et al, x56 Ind. 535 holds that: "The pur-
pose of the statute has its roots in public policy, and is intended
to promote that confidence and full disclosure often absolutely
necessary to a correct treatment of the patient, and which may
be withheld under impending danger of publication. * * *
Shall the efficacy of the statute be destroyed by indirection? To
claim the protection of the statute is the legal right of a patient,
or his representative, and of no less inviolability than any other
personal right, and it is wholly inconsistent with that right to
say that its exercise in a judicial proceeding shall be allowed to
prejudice the cause of him who claims it." On grounds of logic
and reason, the Appellate Division should adopt this rule of
evidence sanctioned by the general consensus of judicial opinion,
but the court closes its eyes to these considerations and justifies
under stare decisis.
